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The interests sections would provide that channel. Unfortunately, new misunderstandings and disagreements over the Cuban role in Angola led to a political backlash in Washington and the channel was never used—not, in any event, for the kind of serious negotiations for which it had been intended.
And so U.S.-Cuban relations rocked along virtually unchanged, with the embargo and various other sanctions in place, all during the Carter, Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Under the latter two, travel controls were also re-imposed. A promising moment seemed to be at hand in 1992. The Soviet Union had collapsed. The Cold War was over and that being the case, the Democratic candidate for President, Bill Clinton, was expected to move toward a more flexible Cuba policy. But Clinton went to Miami in the spring of 1992, took a large campaign donation from the hard-line Cuban American National Foundation and came out of the meeting saying he supported the Cuban Democracy Act, which, in effect, tightened sanctions against Cuba. The Act also had a good deal of support because of the calculation that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Cuba's all-important economic ties to it, the Castro government could not long survive. The Cuban Democracy Act would simply give it the fatal nudge. Clinton stuck to the old policy because of domestic political calculations - and money. He did, however, in his second term, open up to people-to-people exchanges which made it possible for thousands of Americans to travel to Cuba. Meanwhile, Cuba defied all predictions of economic collapse. As the result of reforms and austerity measures, by 1996 the economy was beginning to recover. Recovery was further accelerated in the next decade by new and highly advantageous economic relationships with Venezuela and China, by the sky-high price of nickel, Cuba's principal export, and by what appears to be a promising oil field off Cuba's north coast, for which other countries are already bidding for drilling sites. Cuba's economic future looks better and better. And what seemed to be the most promising opportunity yet for engagement between the U.S. and Cuba came in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Nations all over the world emphasized their support for and solidarity with the United States following that tragedy. Cuba was among them. It immediately condemned the attacks, voiced its solidarity with the American people and opened its air space to any American planes caught in the air after the U.S. closed its own skies. Cuba then signed all 12 U.N. anti-terrorist resolutions, indicated its willingness to cooperate fully with the U.S. in the struggle against terrorism and even to sign a bilateral agreement to that effect. Unfortunately, the Bush administration ignored these friendly overtures and began to assume an even more hostile attitude toward Cuba. Indeed, in October of 2003, President Bush and Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega made it clear that their objective was nothing less than to bring down the Castro regime. "The president," said Noriega, "is determined to see the end of the Castro regime and the dismantling of the apparatus that has kept him in office so long." Shortly thereafter, President Bush named a Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba which in May of 2004 issued a near-500 page report outlining measures to undermine the Castro government and plans for reorganizing the country after its fall. It read like a blueprint for an American occupation, and, indeed, in July of 2005, a U.S. transition coordinator was appointed. In the case of Iraq, the Bush administration had at least waited until it invaded and occupied the country before appointing such a coordinator. Did his appointment in this case mean the U.S. intended to invade Cuba also? And if not, how was he to coordinate a transition there from his office in the State Department building? Even today, some three years later, that remains unclear. Meanwhile, the administration severely cut back on the travel of American citizens to Cuba and in other ways limited contact between the two peoples, even moving in 2004 to severely limit the ability of Cuban-Americans to visit their families on the island. The 2004 report's basic premise that the Castro regime was near collapse was obviously wrong. There were no signs at all that the Cuban economy was faltering. And yet, when the administration issued a new report, on July 10, 2006, that premise was as pronounced in the new report as in the old. The new report was issued with much fanfare and the strong suggestion that the strategy was working and that we'd reached a new stage in the transformation of Cuba. It also called on Cuban citizens and the international community to reject any government that might replace Fidel Castro under the Cuban Constitution. In other words, that Fidel not be succeeded by Raul Castro, the First Vice President. That was deemed "unacceptable." Bad timing. No sooner had the administration said it was unacceptable, than it happened. On July 31, Fidel Castro announced that because of a delicate operation and the need for time to recuperate, he was signing power over to his brother, who would now become acting President. In Miami, of course, there was at first dancing in the streets and interviews reflecting the strong expectation that the Cuban people would not accept Raul Castro and that the Cuban Revolution would collapse forthwith. Reflecting that same kind of thinking, the State Department immediately rejected the transfer of power and demanded instead that the Cuban people be able to freely elect a new government. It even offered to assist their efforts "to work for democratic change" and stressed that the U.S. stood ready to help "Cuba's transition to democracy" in any way possible. But these entreaties calling on the Cuban people to work against the successor government were totally ignored by them. Quite the contrary, they accepted the succession with calm maturity. To date, there has been not a single manifestation of unrest. Raul Castro does not have his brother's charisma, but is a respected figure, recognized for his administrative talents. The Armed Forces, which he commands, is the most efficient and respected institution in the country. There is no indication at all that Fidel Castro will resume the presidency, but things nonetheless continue to run smoothly and normally in Cuba - against all official U.S., predictions. In effect, the transition has taken place. The Bush administration continues to say that it will not deal with a Cuban government that includes either Fidel or Raul Castro. But the effect of that is to leave it on the sidelines talking to itself, for it has no means of bringing the government down. At this point, that would take major military action, which the administration, bogged down as it is in Iraq, is in no position to undertake. And so the U.S. is left with an utterly ineffectual policy. It will not deal with the Cuban government, but it has no means of changing it, or even forcing it to adopt policies more to the U.S. liking. More than anything else, U.S. policy toward Cuba is an embarrassment. As I left the Foreign Service in disgust back in 1982, I noted in my first op-ed in The New York Times that "Cuba seems to have the same effect on American administrations that the full moon once had on werewolves." That remains the case. There may be no sprouting of hair, but we seem to remain incapable of dealing rationally with Cuba. Wayne S. Smith is now a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, D.C.. At the time he left the Foreign Service in 1982 because of his disagreements over Cuba policy, he was Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana and recognized as the State Department's leading specialist on Cuba. |
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